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LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
STUDENT CITIZENS IN SAFE HAVENS?

Jacqueline A. Stefkovich
&

Judith A. Miller·
Police involvement in school searches has become a controversial issue since the Supreme Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1
refused to express an opinion on what constitutes a legal search
when school officials act "in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies." 2 The T.L.O. Court classified school
personnel as state officials for Fourth Amendment purposes, but
allowed them broad authority to conduct searches under the
"reasonable suspicion" standard, a less restrictive standard than
the "probable cause" standard generally required of police officers.3
However, the T.L.O. decision generates more questions than
answers when police and security guards are involved in the
investigation of students. This is especially true when trying to
determine what standard applies to the search. When the fram-
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1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The initials T.L.O. stand for Terry
Lee Owens the student involved in the case. At the time the case went to trial, Terry
Lee Owens was 14 years old. Because she was a minor, the legal system protected her
by identifying her with initials only. This means of identification is often used with
minors.
2. Id. at 341, n.7.
3. See id. at 341.

25

26

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1999

ers of the United States Constitution included the Fourth
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, they did so to protect the privacy and security of all Americans from arbitrary invasions by
government officials. They did not anticipate that one day this
country would have a large public school system, and that the
school officials would be so concerned with violence and safety
that they would need the assistance of the police in conducting
student searches.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or thing to be seized."4
For many years, the United States Supreme Court found the
Fourth Amendment inapplicable to public school students. Up
until the late 1960s, search and seizure was not really an issue
in public schools. Accepted methods of discipline fell under the
in loco parentis doctrine. 5 In loco parentis means that school
officials stood in the place of parents in maintaining supervision
and discipline of students.
Teachers and administrators "enjoyed many of the same
rights and privileges afforded to parents in matters of safety,
discipline, and the general well-being of school children."6 More

4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is important to note that the U.S. Constitution
protects citizens only against unlawful interference or infringement of their rights by
the government. Public school officials are considered government agents. Thus, while
public school students are protected by the Bill of Rights, students in private schools
are not.
5. The legal term for the relationship between teacher and student is in loco
parentis or in the place of the parent. Blackstone, in his commentaries, stated:
a parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz, that
of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for
which he is employed.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453. Originally, in loco parentis gave teachers
and administrators almost unlimited authority in disciplining students. The doctrine
applied when students were in school, en route to and from school, and at school
sponsored activities in and away from school.
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over, under the doctrine of in loco parentis, school officials, like
parents, were considered private individuals, not officials of the
state. 7 As a result, they were not subject to the constraints of
probable cause and search warrants specified in the Fourth
Amendment.
It followed that if parents could search their children and
take from them things that they considered unacceptable, school
officials could search the same children at school and seize materials deemed inappropriate in the school setting. 8 In the case
In re Donaldson, 9 a California court of appeals held that in matters of discipline, the school stood in loco parentis which included the right of school officials to conduct searches. 10 The
Donaldson court even allowed the use of "moderate force" in
obtaining obedience from students just as parents had the right
to use force to gain obedience from their children. 11
By classifying school searches as falling under the in loco
parentis theory, the courts were able to side step the question of
applicability of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, T.L.O. clarifies that the reasonableness standard applies
to searches by school officials. As long as school searches were
for harmless contraband, such as bubble-gum, spit balls, water
pistols, or pea shooters, neither the courts nor anyone else
gave much consideration to the rights of children to be free
from teachers' searches. A handful of bubble-gum, if confiscated from a student's pocket, did not seem to raise a constitutional issue. However, once school officials began discovering
illegal drugs and dangerous weapons like guns, knives, and
razor blades on school property, search and seizure became an
issue in public schools. 12

6. M. Teresa Harris, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: New Standard of Review or New
Label?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 157, 163-64 (1985).
7. See id. at 164.
8. See David Alden Walls, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Fourth Amendment Applied
to School Searches, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 225, 230 (1986).
9. 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
10. Seeid. at 223. See also Dale Edward F.T. Zane, Note, School Searches Under
the Fourth Amendment: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 72 CORNELL L. REV. 368, 378 (1987).
11. In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
12. John C. Hogan and Mortimer D. Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the
Public Schools, 7 WHITIIER L. REV. 527, 529 (1985).
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No longer were students simply breaking the rules, they were
committing crimes in school. School officials were confiscating
evidence of those crimes and, in many instances, handing the
evidence over to the police. 13
As a result, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark
case of New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 1985. 14 The Court found that the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures applied to public school officials under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 15 New Jersey v. T.L.O. laid to rest the concept of in
loco parentis as the basis for a school's authority: "In carrying
out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such
policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not
merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."16
Even more important was the Court's establishment of the
reasonable suspicion standard which clarified the criteria under
which school officials could conduct student searches. 17 However,
the Court refused to clarify what constituted a legal student
search by school officials working with the police. This paper
attempts to outline what constitutes a legal search in such circumstances.
The remainder of this article is divided into the following
parts. Part II examines issues of school safety and violence,
setting the stage for understanding the nature of police involvement in schools and why it has become such an important legal
issue. Part III describes students' Fourth Amendment rights in
schools and the legal standards used in conducting student
searches. Part IV concentrates on the doctrines to consider in

13. In many states school officials are required by law to hand over to police any
evidence of a crime committed in school. Common types of evidence confiscated from
students include drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and money. See generally CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154a (West 1998).
14. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
15. "It is now beyond dispute that 'the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officer§.'
Id.at 334 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)) (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added).
17. See id. at 342. Under the reasonable suspicion standard, school officials must
have a reasonable belief that the search will uncover evidence that the student(s)
committed a crime or violated a school rule. They must also limit the search so that
it is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student(s) and the
nature of the offense.
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framing a standard to be used when police are involved in school
searches. Part V discusses the standards used when police are
involved in school searches. Part VI discusses the dilemma
raised due to the ambiguous role of school security guards, who
may act as school officials or law enforcement officers. Part VII
summarizes the legal issues and problems arising from police
involvement in schools and proposes that students be subject to
the same legal standards as adults when police and security
guards are involved in school searches.
II. SCHOOL SAFETY AND VIOLENCE
A.

The Rise of Police Involvement in Public Schools

At the time New Jersey v. T.L.0. 18 was decided, there was
mounting concern for the safety of students in public schools. In
the opinion, Justice White stated:
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining
order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms:
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major
social problems. 19

Justice White made reference to a 1978 study by the National Institute of Education, (NIE) which surveyed principals,
teachers, and students on the large extent of criminal activity in
schools across the nation. 20 The NIE survey, however, was only

18. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
19. !d. at 339.
20. !d.; See Keith Baker, Research Evidence of a School Discipline Problem, Pm
DELTA KAPPAN, March 1985, at 483-85 (noting that in the NIE study, data on criminal
activity were gathered on a monthly basis and included the following statistics during
the period studied: 282,000 students were physically attacked; 112,000 students were
robbed through force, weapons or threat; 2.4 million students had personal property
stolen; 800,000 students stayed home because they were afraid to attend school; 6,000
teachers were robbed; 1,000 teachers were assaulted and required medical attention;
125,000 teachers were threatened with physical hann; more than 125,000 teachers
encountered at least one situation in which they were afraid to confront misbehaving
students; one out of two teachers was on the receiving end of an insult or obscene
gesture; 2,400 fires were set in schools; 13,000 thefts of school property occurred; 24,000
incidents of vandalism occurred; 42,000 cases of damage to school property occurred).
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one of a series of surveys on school violence conducted at that
time. 21
President Ronald Reagan made school safety an issue in a
1984 radio address. Pointing out that violence in schools negatively affects learning and teaching, Reagan called on the country to begin solving discipline problems. 22 At the same time, he
directed the Justice Department to establish the National
School Safety Center (NSSC). Funded by a grant from the office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the NSSC focused on providing a central headquarters to help school board
members, educators, law enforcement officials, lawyers, community leaders, and the general public promote safety and academic excellence. 23
In the early 1990s there was even more public concern for
school safety. The results of polls conducted by a variety of organizations ranging from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to the National Rifle Association reflected these concerns. 24

21. See Gary L. Bauer, Restoring Order to Public Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN,
March 1985, at 490 (noting that in 1983, two years before T.L.O. was decided, the
Detroit Free Press surveyed Michigan teachers and found that 46 percent had been
threatened with violence during the past year; one out of five had been assaulted by
a student. In the same year, a Boston study found that 63 crimes had occurred for each
100 students, and one out of four high school students admitted to carrying a weapon
to school. Further, half of Boston's teachers had been victims of crime five or more
times during the school year. And another survey, conducted by the National Education
Association, found that 28 percent of all teachers across the nation had been victims
of theft or vandalism; 4.2 percent had been attacked by students; and over 90 percent
of teachers surveyed stated that student misbehavior had "deleterious" effects on their
teaching).
22. See Ronald Reagan, The President's Radio Address to the Nation on
Education, reproduced in AM. EDUC., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 2-3.
23. See George Nicholson, An Introduction to the National School Safety Center,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, March 1985, at 492.
24. See CNN News: NSBA Study Shows Increased Violence within Schools (CNN
television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1994) (transcript on file with author) (noting that in its
survey of over 700 school districts representing thousands of schools, the National
School Boards Association found that violence had increased 82 percent over the last
five years, crippling students' ability to learn); How School Districts are Responding to
Violence, EDUC. USA, Jan. 17, 1994, at 6 (showing a large majority of school officials
believed school violence had increased during the previous five years and that threefourths of the 720 who responded to the NSBA poll reported that their schools had
dealt with violent student-on-student incidents in 1993, and 13 percent reported a
knifing or shooting); Back to School Survey, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 5, 1993 (noting
that the National Rifle Association found that one-third of parents surveyed worried
about gun violence in schools and that twenty percent of the parents reported that their
children were concerned about the presence of guns in schools) Survey Finds School
Violence Hits 1 in 4 Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.17, 1993, at 37 (reporting that in the
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At the same time, the media reported numerous instances of
shootings and other violent incidents in schools. 25 These occurrences often involved the police. 26 As Jessica Portner noted:

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) survey, nearly one in four students and
one in ten teachers said they had been victims of violence on or near school property).
25. See, e.g., WEAPONS: A DEADLY ROLE IN THE DRAMA OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE,
CENTER NEWS SERVICE, 1993 (noting how, in Junction City, Kansas, a 14-year-old was
accidentally shot in the head after an argument between boys resulted in gunfire and
on that same day, in Atlanta, Georgia, a 15-year-old student was shot and killed in a
crowded lunch room by a fellow student with whom he had been feuding, wounding
another student in the scuffie); Carol Innerst, Pistol Packing Kids Put Schools on Alert:
School Officials Find More Students Armed, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1A (stating
that in Queen Annes County, Maryland, there have been incidents involving middle
school children carrying guns and in Montgomery County schools, incidents of students
carrying and using guns, stunners, and localizers quadrupled).
26. See Sam Dillon, On the Barricades Against Violence in Schools: As Fears over
Security Grow, New York's School Safety Force Struggles to Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1993, at B1 (stating that 3,000 uniformed, but unarmed, security officers are posted
in schools throughout New York City, their main mission-to protect students and staff,
and that the force is the country's ninth largest police agency with 990 vehicles and
a budget of 73 million dollars); Alison Mitchell, Giuliani Sees Role for Police in the
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at B1 (reporting that school police, though armed
with only handcuffs and radios, are peace officers with authority to make arrests and
they have their own training academy and report to the Board of Education's Division
of School Safety); Joseph P. Fried, Queens Experiment to Fight School Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at B5 (reporting that school officials and community members at
Rockaway High School in Queens, New York want a more expanded police presence to
help faculty teach students about the dangers of guns and violence and to resolve
conflict in nonviolent ways); Todd J. Gillman, Securing Our Schools: Badges in the
Halls, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1A (reporting that forty-six school
districts in Texas have their own police departments that handle gang violence); Aline
McKenzie, Mesquite District Approves Police in Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
15, 1993, at 12 (reporting that like other school police in Texas, these resource officers
wear uniforms, are armed, and their primary function is to provide increased security
and to teach and counsel students); Carol lnnerst, Pistol Packing Kids Put Schools on
Alert: School Officials Find More Students Armed, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1A
(reporting that in Oakland and Los Angeles, California, and even in places as small as
Oakeville, Wyoming, bullet drills are commonplace, and in Tacoma, Washington,
security officers and principals wear bullet proof vests); Rochelle L. Stanfield, Safe
Passage, NAT'L J., Sept. 25, 1993, at 2305 (reporting that in Indianapolis school security
officers meet sixth to twelfth graders as they walk into school); Lauren Robinson, $16.3
Million is Asked for Safer Schools: Boston Task Force Targets Violence, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 24, 1992, at 2 (reporting that Boston's City-wide Youth Safety Committee has
requested 16.3 million dollars to be spent over the next three years to stop violence in
public schools); Susan Reed, Reading, Writing, and Murder, PEOPLE, June 14, 1993, at
44 (noting that teachers in Rochester, New York placed safety ahead of salary in their
labor negotiations, and in Dade County, Florida, 14 million dollars was budgeted for
school security); Laura Wisniewski, State Plans Task Force on Violence in Schools,
ATLANTA J., July, 20, 1993, at D1 (noting that an Atlanta task force comprised of
educators, law enforcement officials, and business leaders sought creative solutions to
school violence other than metal detectors and police officers).
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[T]wenty years ago, most school officials would never have
dreamed of allocating their precious resources to hire armed
police to protect campuses. If increased security was required
for a football game or a school dance, a district typically hired
security officers for the night .... Today, more than 50 school
districts have spent millions of dollars to set up professionally
trained school police forces that operate around the clock. In
the late 1970s, there were fewer than 100 school police officers
in the United States. Today, there are more than 2,000. 27
Shortly after Portner made her observations, Congress
passed the Safe Schools Act of 1994. This act, among other
things, allowed school districts with high rates of crime, violence, and disciplinary problems to compete for federal grants. 28
These grants could be used for a variety of violence prevention
and school safety issues. Up to one-third of each grant could be
spent on metal detectors or hiring security guards. 29 While this
federal program focused on developing long-term goals and
strategies to prevent violence in schools, the framers of this
legislation also recognized a need to increase the presence of
security guards in schools. Thus police and quasi law enforcement officers became increasingly involved in public schools for
a variety of reasons ranging from protection of students to education programs, such as peer mediation and crime prevention.

B. The Nature of Police Involvement in Public Schools
Police involvement in searches may take on many faces, such
as patrolling schools, participating in crime-prevention programs, teaching about drug abuse and prevention, and dealing
with truancy. It can also ultimately affect students' Fourth
Amendment rights. There are a variety of ways police become
involved in school searches.

27. Jessica Portner, Cops on Campus, 13 EDUC. WEEK 26, 30, June 22, 1994.
28. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 5961, 5962 (1998). School districts that develop a
comprehensive, long term plan to combat and prevent violence could receive as much
as three million dollars per year for a period of up to two years. School districts,
however, must be able to show evidence that they have experienced a high rate of
murders committed by youth; school expulsions, suspensions, or alternative placements;
youth involvement in the criminal justice system; and crimes in which youth are
victims.
29. See id. at § 5965(a)(13).
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First, police may give tips to school officials that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed on school property.
In this situation the police have shared information with school
administrators but have not told them what to do with the information. Second, police may give tips to school security guards.
The information shared usually relates to criminal activity,
warning the guards that a crime has been committed on school
property. Third, police may become involved in school searches
when they investigate a crime that started outside of school.
Fourth, school officials may request police presence to witness a
search or to act as consultants. 3° Fifth, police are involved in
school searches when they are called into school to help with a
discipline problem and end up conducting an investigation and
then a search. In the latter situation, police may be the fact
finders, make the decision to search, and direct and conduct the
search with the outcome being possible criminal prosecution for
the student. Police may also simply "stand by" while school officials conduct a search. In this latter capacity, police are present
but involved neither in the fact-finding nor in the search. Sixth,
police may be involved in school searches when they are hired
by school districts. In such situations, police help deter crime by
patrolling the halls and school grounds. Finally, they also do
routine police work in a school setting. 31
School security guards are also involved in school searches.
Because these guards are hired to assist with school safety and
discipline, they are in a unique position to witness a crime occurring and to conduct a search. As employees of the school district, they are familiar with their assigned school. They get to
know students and staff and gain their trust. As a result they
develop networks of communication, which provide crucial information that leads to finding students who have broken school
rules, who have committed a crime, or who are about to commit
a crime. 32

30. See, e.g., LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2d ed. 1995).
31.

See id.

32. See Judith A. Miller, How Police Involvement in Public School Searches
Creates a Dilemma in Determining the Applicable Fourth Amendment Standard:
Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause (1996) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple
University) (on file with author).
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Security guards become involved in school searches when
they receive a tip from the police or when they assist a school
administrator with a search. As part of their job, school security
officers often patrol parking lots, which could result in searching
students or their automobiles. Finally, security officers may be
involved in school searches through the use of metal detectors.
They may use hand-held detectors or install monitor detectors
that are installed to search students and staff for weapons. 33
III. New Jersey u. T.L.O.: THE STANDARD FOR
SEARCHING STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

New Jersey u. T.L.O.was the first Supreme Court opinion to
address the Fourth Amendment rights of students in public
schools. 34 The Court set a reasonableness standard for searching
students>15 Although the standard of reasonableness was clearly
defined in T.L.O., the Court's decision was limited to personal
searches ofindividual students by school administrators and did
not address the standard needed for school searches involving
police officers. 36
A. Facts of New Jersey u. T.L.O.
In 1980, at Piscataway (New Jersey) High School, a teacher
discovered two students smoking in a lavatory. 37 One of the students was T.L.O., a fourteen-year-old ninth grade student. 38 The
teacher took both students to the office because smoking was a
violation of school rules. 39 The assistant principal, Ted Choplick,
questioned both students. 40 T.L.O.'s companion admitted that
she had been smoking and so was suspended. T.L.O., however,
denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory. She also
claimed that she did not smoke at all. 41

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
See id. at 341.
See id. at 342-43.
See id. at 328.
See id.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
See id.
See id.
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At that point in the investigation, the assistant principal
asked T.L.O. to come into his office. 42 He demanded to see her
purse. 43 When he opened T.L.O.'s purse, he found a pack of cigarettes.44 He then removed the cigarettes from the purse.45 In the
process of removing the cigarettes, he also saw a package of
cigarette rolling papers. 46 The assistant principal's previous
experience had led him to the conclusion that possession of rolling papers by high school students was associated with marijuana use. 47 This led him to search T.L.O.'s purse for further
evidence of drug use. 48 His search revealed a small amount of
marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial
quantity of one dollar bills, an index card containing a list of
students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. 49 The assistant principal notified
T.L.O.'s mother and the police and turned over to the police
evidence ofT.L.O.'s drug dealing. 50 At the police station, T.L.O.,
in the presence ofher mother and the police, admitted to selling
marijuana in school. 51
B. Procedural History of New Jersey v. T.L.O.
The State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. based
on her confession and the evidence seized by the assistant principal. 52 T.L.O. contended that the assistant principal's search of
her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 53 As a result,
she moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse. She also
moved to suppress her confession, which she claimed was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. 54 Finding the search
reasonable, the juvenile court denied T.L.O.'s motion to suppress
the evidence. 55 The court held that T.L.O. was a delinquent and

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
id.
id.
id.
id.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
id.
id. at 328-29.
id. at 329.
id.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329.
id. at 328.
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sentenced her to one year of probation. 56 On appeal, a divided
state court affirmed the finding that the search was reasonable
but vacated the delinquency judgment. 57 The case was remanded
to determine "whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily
waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing." 58
T.L.O. appealed the court's ruling that the search was legal
under the Fourth Amendment. 59 The New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment
applies to school officials but held that the search conducted by
Mr. Choplick was unreasonable. 60 The school rule that T.L.O.
was accused of violating was smoking in the lavatory. 61 Possession of cigarettes, as revealed by the search, was not in violation
of school rules. 62 Hence, the search was not justified. 63 Moreover,
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. possessed
cigarettes. 64 Finally, the court held that the evidence of drug use
Mr. Choplick found in the purse did not justify his "rummaging"
through its contents. 65 The New Jersey Supreme Court also
maintained that the exclusionary rule is applicable to juvenile
proceedings. 66 Therefore, if school officials violate a student's
Fourth Amendment rights through means of an illegal search,
then evidence confiscated during the search would not be admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. 67
The State of New Jersey appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court on the exclusionary issue only. 68 On appeal the question was "whether the exclusionary rule should
operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings
of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the
involvement of law enforcement officers."69 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari but, upon reconsideration, decided this ques-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 330.
See id.
!d.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330.
See id. at 330-31.
See id. at 328.
See id. at 331.
See id.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331.
See id.
See id. at 330.
See id. at 331.
See id.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331.
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tion could not be answered in isolation from the Fourth Amendment issue. 70 After hearing arguments from both sides, the Supreme Court ruled that the search ofT.L.O.'s purse was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 71 Because the
search was legal, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to
exclude the evidence was erroneous. 72 However, the Court reserved opinion about whether the exclusionary rule would apply
if the search had been illegal. 73 The Court stated:
[l]n holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that
the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches
conducted by school authorities. The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves
two distinct inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the
exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation.
Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for a
negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of
the case. Thus, our determination that the search at issue in
this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no
particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule. 74
C. The T.L. 0. Standard for School Searches

T.L.O. is important because it set reasonable suspicion as
the standard for searching students in public schools. 75 This
means that a school official may properly conduct a search of a
student if, in consideration of all the circumstances, the official
has a reasonable belief that a crime or violation of school rules
has been, or is in the process of being, committed. 7!i To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, the court developed
a two prong test. 77 First, the search must be justified at its inception, (i.e., school officials from the very beginning must reasonably believe that the search will uncover evidence of a viola-

70. See id.
71. See !d.
72. See !d.
73. See !d.
74. T.L.O.,
75. See !d.
76. See Id.
77. See !d.

at 332.
at 332-33.
at 348.
at 333 n.3.
469 U.S. at 333.
at 341.
at 341-42.
at 341.
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tion of law or a school rule). 78 Second, the scope of the search
must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."79
The reasonable suspicion standard is different from the
stricter Fourth Amendment probable cause standard the police
must meet to search citizens. Probable cause exists "when facts
and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he
has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense
has been or is being committed."80 The police generally need to
present this information to a magistrate to secure a warrant to
search. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has found
that absolute application of this rule in all situations would
greatly hamper police work. For this reason, the Court created
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 81
The reasonable suspicion standard affords students in
schools fewer protections than are normally afforded to citizens
under the stricter probable cause standard. The reason for this
is that the rights of students in schools must be balanced
against the administrator's duty to maintain order and discipline in school. 82 In T.L.O. the Court found that "the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches
by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school
environment ... [and] would unduly interfere with the mainte-

78. Id. at 341-42.
79. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (6th ed. 1990).
81. See RICHARD D. STRAHAN & CHARLES TuRNER, THE COURTS AND THE SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT TODAY 134 (Longman Press, New York)
(1987). When police search ordinary citizens, they need probable cause and a warrant
unless they search under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. These
exceptions include searches conducted: (a) incident to a valid arrest; (b) under exigent
circumstances (generally used to ensure that evidence is not destroyed, when there is
danger to life, or when police are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect who would otherwise
escape); (c) when evidence is in "plain view"; (d) after consent is obtained; (e) relative
to the "stop and frisk" doctrine and (f) as inspections or regulatory searches. If there
is an exception to the warrant requirement, then the reasonable suspicion standard or
the probable cause standard or neither may apply depending upon the exception or the
circumstances. For instance, consent requires no suspicion at all, while "stop and frisk"
searches require some suspicion but not probable cause.
82. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
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nance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in
the schools."83
Furthermore, the T.L.O. court maintained that by focusing
attention on the question of reasonableness, this standard
would:
[S]pare [school officials] the necessity of schooling themselves
in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate
their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should
ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools. 84
Thus, T.L.O. clarifies that the reasonableness standard applies
to searches by school officials.

IV. DOCTRINES TO CONSIDER IN FRAMING A
STANDARD FOR POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL
SEARCHES
While T.L.O. established the standard for public school officials to search students in schools, the decision did not state
which standard would apply to searches by the police in schools.
The Court observed:
We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does
not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies,
and we express no opinion on that question. 85
Neither did the T.L.O. court speak of the standard that should
be applied to those in the schools performing quasi police functions, such as security guards.
Before discussing these standards in any depth, several
bright-line laws created by the courts need to be considered.
First, police (who are generally required to use a probable cause
standard in conducting searches) may not use school officials

83. !d.
84. !d. at 343.
85. Id. at 341 n.7.
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(who have the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion) to search
students and then ask the officials to hand them the evidence on
a "silver platter."86 Similarly, the appropriate standard for
police-related searches in schools will be determined by who is
the agent of the search. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the
exclusionary rule states that evidence obtained through an illegal search may not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.

A. The Silver Platter Doctrine
At the time ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's decision in T.L.O.,
there was concern that police would abuse the reasonable suspicion standard. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
T.L.O. case, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wrote
an amicus curiae brief87 requesting the Court to apply the probable cause standard to the search and seizure of a juvenile by a
school official or to affirm the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 88 The ACLU argued that juvenile students, like
adults, are persons whose rights are protected from intrusion by
the U.S. Constitution. 89
The ACLU was further concerned that the reasonable suspicion standard would infringe on students' rights by allowing
police to receive evidence of a crime from school officials without
having to enter the school, without satisfying the requirement of
probable cause, and without obtaining a warrant. Moreover,
under the reasonable suspicion standard this evidence could be
used to convict a student of a crime. What made the reasonable
suspicion standard even more of a concern at the time was the
existence in some states (like New Jersey) of a mandate requir-

86. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960).
87. Amicus curiae, or friend of the court is defined as:
A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action
may petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of
a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views.
Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals concerning matters
of a broad public interest.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990). In T.L.O. the broad public interest was the
violation of a student's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and
seizure.
88. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey in support of affirmance for Respondent
at 39, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (No. 83-712) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
89. See id. at 3.

25]

SCHOOL SEARCHES BY POLICE

41

ing school officials to report any criminal acts to the police. 90
Similarly, local school boards had policies requiring school officials to notify the police when a crime had been committed in
school. This factor strengthened the ACLU's argument in favor
of applying the exclusionary rule in T.L.O.'s case. 91
The thrust of this argument was that school officials would
be able to search a student under a lesser standard, obtain evidence of a crime, and turn that evidence over to police "on a
silver platter" for use in the criminal prosecution of the student.92 The ACLU argued that, just as the Court had struck
down the silver platter doctrine in Elkins u. United States, 93 the
Court should not allow the police to benefit from a rule permitting school officials such broad discretion in conducting searches
under the guise ofmaintaining discipline. 94
B. Agency Theory

Commentators have voiced concern about the danger of police abuse of the reasonable suspicion standard. This concern
emanates from the Court's refusal to delineate a standard governing school searches in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies. 95 What is the appropriate standard to

90. See id.
91. See id. at 4. In its brief the ACLU explained that "applying the exclusionary
rule would inhibit collusion between school officials and the police, deter arbitrary and
unchecked searches of students by school officials, and provide a meaningful mechanism
for discouraging unwarranted invasions of the right of juveniles to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures."
92. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 87 at 23. The silver platter doctrine allowed
evidence obtained illegally by state officials to be admissible in federal prosecutions
because no federal official had participated in the violation of the defendant's rights.
The doctrine was struck down in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), when the
Supreme Court noted that such a distinction became patently illogical once the Fourth
Amendment became applicable to the States.
93. 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
94. See id. at 221-22. As the Court reasoned in Elkins, although cooperation
between various governmental entities is to be encouraged, where one of those entities
is not entitled to conduct a search in order to obtain evidence, it can neither directly
nor indirectly encourage another entity to obtain such evidence nor accept such evidence
from the other governmental entity. See also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 87 at 23.
95. See, e.g., Patrick K. Perrin, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protection in the
School Environment: The Colorado Supreme Court's Application of the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard in State v. P.E.A., 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 169 (1990) (noting that
school searches are the only category of searches that allow a full-scale search for
evidence of criminal wrongdoing based on less than probable cause, and that the
flexible reasonable suspicion standard could lead to abuses by school officials and the
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apply when police become involved in school searches? Professor
Van Geel commented on the dilemma associated with the standard: "When police collaborate with school officials in student
searches, the collaboration is often viewed as a police search,
invoking the stricter probable cause standard. [Knowing this,]
school officials might tend to shy away from working with police
which could lead to no collaboration or possibly covert collaboration."96 On the other hand, "when police and school officials collaborate extensively, a real danger exists that the police will try
to circumvent the stricter probable cause standard in favor of
the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard."97
The problem with identifying the appropriate standard in
schools is the difficulty in determining whether the police are
acting alone, or as agents of the school, or if school officials conducting the searches are acting as agents of the police. Several
courts have proposed tests to determine whether an agency relationship exists. In Illinois v. Gates, 98 the United States Supreme
Court proposed that in deciding whether a search was valid, a
"totality of the circumstances" must be considered. In State v.
P.E.A. the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this test as also
applying to a determination of agency. 99
The Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Snowadzki 100 provided a more
specific test to determine whether an agency relationship exists.
This test, however, relies heavily on the subjective state of mind
of school officials and police. 101 This test has two parts: whether
the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct
(search) and whether the party (school official or school security
officer) intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further
his own ends. 102

police).
96. Tyll Van Gee!, The Safe & Orderly School, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN
EDUCATION LAW 315, 334-35 (1987).
97. Id. at 335.
98. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). See also Williams by Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.
2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990)) (maintaining
that totality of the circumstances is also applicable to the reasonable suspicion
standard).
99. 754 P.2d 382, 385 (Colo. 1988).
100. 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984).
101. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 172.
102. See id. at 171-72.
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C. The Exclusionary Rule
Many commentators favor applying the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained in searches of students by school officials and
turned over to the police. 103 One reason for this is that the
exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent to law enforcement officials
by keeping them from engaging in unconstitutional searches.
Another reason is that judicial integrity is at stake if the court
allows the use of tainted evidence. 104 A third reason is that the
government should not profit from its own wrongdoing. This
means that if the government discovers evidence in an unlawful
search, it should not benefit from its own lawlessness by using
tainted evidence. Commentators argue that when such occurrences happen in schools, students who see their teachers engaging in unlawful searches without consequences will not be
encouraged to obey the law. 105
These concerns are not unlike those of Justice Brennan who
dissented against setting aside the probable cause standard for
determining the validity of a school search. 106 Expressing his
concern over the importance of student privacy issues, Justice
Brennan stated in T.L.O. that "the Court fails to cite any case in
which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been
justified on less than probable cause." 107 He noted that "categories of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than fullscale searches and seizures may be justifiable in accordance
with a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause,
provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient weight to
the privacy interests that will be infringed." 108 Justice Brennan
goes even further, stating that school districts should consult
court decisions and other legal materials and "prepare a booklet
expounding the rough outlines of the concept [of probable cause

103. See, e.g., Charles W. Harden, Jr., Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the
Exclusionary Rule, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1099, 1111-14 (1988).
104. See id. n.104 at 112-13. "If a court tolerates official lawlessness by allowing
use of tainted evidence seized by a school authority, students 'cannot help but feel they
have been dealt with unfairly' and their once well-founded respect for the judiciary may
be forever lost."
105. See id. See also Jefferson L. Johnson and Donald W. Crawley, T.L.O. and the
Student's Right to Privacy, 36 EDUC. THEORY 211, 221 (1986).
106. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. ld. at 360.
108. Id. at 355.
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and distribute it to teachers to] ... provide them with guidance
as to when a search may be lawfully conducted." 109
Similarly, Justice Stevens in his T.L.O. dissent, expressed
the fear that the reasonable suspicion standard would allow
school officials to search students under suspicion of the "most
trivial" violations of school rules.no "For the Court, a search for
curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code
is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang activity." 111 Stevens argued that
the T.L.O. decision would permit school administrators to search
students to enforce school rules in a wide variety of situations,
including secret societies, use of parking lots, attendance at
athletic events, and unauthorized absences. 112
While Justice Stevens was willing to adopt an exception to
the warrant requirement, he believed that the appropriate standard would permit a search only when a school official had reason to believe that "the search will uncover evidence that the
student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process."m In
his conclusion, Justice Stevens stated, "The rule the Court
adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth
Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Although I agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that
authority is not unlimited." 114
A number of commentators agreed with Stevens' view that
the "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test leaves
itself open to abuse. 115 One school official's definition of reasonable may not agree with that of another official. 116 Such discrep

109. Id. at 365-66. This argument, however, overlooks the difficulty that even
experienced police officers sometimes have in understanding and applying the probable
cause standard.
110. ld. at 371 <Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 377 (1985).
112. See id. at 377 n.16.
113. Id. at 378 (emphasis in original).
114. ld. at 385.
115. See, e.g., John A. Hamilton, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of
Fourth Amendment Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D. L. REV. 574, 594-95 (1985).
116. See id. But see Joseph R. McKinney, The Fourth Amendment and the Public
Schools: Reasonable Suspicion in the 1990s, 91 ED. LAW REP. 455, 457 (1994); J.M.
Sanchez, Expelling the Fourth Amendment from American Schools: Students' Rights Six
Years after T.L.O., 21 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 409 (noting that the vast majority of Fourth
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ancies leave the door wide open for police to abuse the reasonable suspicion standard by using, in a subsequent criminal proceeding, evidence gathered in a search of a student who broke a
school rule. 117

V. STANDARDS USED WHEN POLICE ARE INVOLVED IN
SCHOOL SEARCHES
While T.L.O. did not specifically address the standard to be
used when police and school security guards are involved in
school searches, lower courts and legal commentators have offered opinions on this topic. A review of cases and commentary
implies that the standard may vary depending upon the nature
of the involvement. The more that police and security guards are
involved in the investigation leading up to the search, in the
decision to search, and in the actual search, the more likely the
court will enforce the stricter probable cause standard. When
involvement is limited, courts are more apt to allow the search
under the reasonable suspicion standard.
A. The Probable Cause Standard

In general, the probable cause standard is required when the
police initiate the search or when the search is done at the behest ofthe police. 118 When school officials search at the urging of
the police, they act as agents of the police. In such situations,
police are involved before the actual search. For example, in
Picha v. Wieglos, 119 a phone call tipped off school officials that a
student was in possession of illegal drugs. 120 School officials
called the police before gathering any additional facts. 121 The
reason for involving police was to uncover evidence of a crime.
Reasoning that police involvement at the outset turns a search
into a hunt for contraband, the Picha court found that such a
search went beyond the school's interest in maintaining disci-

Amendment cases in schools are decided in favor of the school district).
117. See Gwendolyn G. Combs, Note, How the Fourth Amendment Applies to Public
High School Students - New Jersey v. T.L.O., 6 MISS. C. L. REV. 149, 167 (1986).
118. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 169 (noting that the majority of courts that have
considered the issue indicate probable cause as the appropriate standard).
119. 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
120. See id. at 1216.
121. See id.

46

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1999

pline. 122 Therefore, a search done at the behest of the police had
to meet the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.123
Courts often distinguish between police searches for evidence of a criminal violation and those searching for evidence of
a violation of a school rule. The latter instance rarely requires a
probable cause standard while the former often does. For instance, in F.P. v. State 124 the police were investigating a burglary .125 In the process, a police officer questioned a middleschool student, who told him that F.P. had shown him car keys
and an "automotive paper." 126 The student also told the police
that F.P. said he had a stolen car. 127 The police officer then told
the school resource officer, an employee of the sheriff's office,
who worked at the school. 128 The resource officer was paid by the
school board, but handled law enforcement matters in the
school. 129 The school resource officer found F.P. 130 After summoning the police, she took him to her office and asked if he had
anything to give her. 131 F.P. put car keys and the automotive
paper on the officer's desk. 132 The police officer joined F.P. and
the resource officer. 133 F.P. was given Miranda warnings by the
police officer. 134 F.P. waived his rights and admitted that he had
found the keys and paper on a car behind a rental agency and
that he had intended to drive the car around later that day. 135
The state appeals court reversed the trial court stating that
the school official exception to the probable cause requirement
for a warrantless search does not apply when the search is carried out at the behest of the police. 136 Because the resource officer acted at the behest of the police officer, the state had to

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 1221.
See id.
528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
See id. at 1254.
!d.
See id.
See id. at 1254, 1254 n.l.
See F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254, n.l.
See id. at 1254.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254.
See id.
See id. at 1255.
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prove that F.P. consented to the search or that there was probable cause to believe that F.P. had violated the law and possessed
evidence of that violation. 137

B. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard in Individual Searches
The reasonable suspicion standard generally applies when
school officials request the police to conduct a search. For example, in Martens u. District No. 220/38 the school's dean of students, Joan Baukus, received an anonymous tip that a student
kept drug paraphernalia in the lining of his coat. 139 Ms. Baukus
brought the student to her office and confronted him about the
information obtained from the anonymous tip. 140 The student
denied that he possessed a controlled substance and refused to
consent to a search until his parents were contacted. 141 Meanwhile, Officer Hentig, a sheriff's deputy, arrived at the school on
another matter. 142 He came to the assistant principal's office and
spoke to the student encouraging him to cooperate with school
officials. 143 The deputy then asked the student to empty his
pockets and the student did so. 144 In his pockets was a pipe containing marijuana residue. 145 The student was suspended from
school but faced no criminal charges as a result of the search. 146
In finding for the school district, the court stated that there
was a basic difference between Martens and T.£.0. 147 In T.L.O.
the entire investigation and search was conducted by school
officials. 148 In Martens, the search was done at the urging of and
in the presence of the deputy. 149 Despite the official presence of
Hentig as a law enforcement officer, the court held that reasonable suspicion was the appropriate standard because of the relatively limited role played by the deputy. 150 More specifically, the

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
620 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
See id. at 30.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 31.
See Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 31.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 32.
See Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 32.
See id.
See id. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court found that the
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search was conducted in the administrator's office. 151 Officer
Hentig had nothing to do with developing the facts that instigated the search nor did he direct school officials to detain and
search Martens. 152
In short, Hentig's urging was the immediate cause of Marten's
[sic] emptying his pockets, but there is no indication that a
criminal investigation was contemplated, that this was a cooperative effort with law enforcement, or that but for this intervention Martens would not have been searched eventually ....
[And t]here is ... no basis for thinking that school official action was a subterfuge to avoid warrant and probable cause
requirements. 153

The reasonable susp1c10n standard may also suffice in
searches involving a "tip" passed on to school officials from the
police, but where the police do not actually conduct the search.
State v. P.E.A. 154 involved a police officer who was investigating
a bicycle theft at the local junior high school. 155 During the questioning of a student, he discovered that two high school students
had stolen marijuana from a backyard, dried it, cured it, and
packaged it with the intent to sell it to other high school students that morning. 156 The officer went to the high school and
advised the assistant principal of these allegations. 157 The officer
was asked to remain at the school while the assistant principal
investigated. 158
The assistant principal asked the school security officer to
help investigate the officer's report. 159 The two students were
questioned and searched in separate rooms. 160 The investigation
produced no evidence, but the students stated that they came to
school in P.E.A.'s car. 161 P.E.A. was then questioned and

higher standard of probable cause had been met.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 32.
154. 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988).
155. See id. at 384.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 384.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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searched. 162 After first lying and claiming he had ridden the bus
to school, P.E.A. admitted that he had driven his car. 163 The
security officer took P.E.A.'s keys, which were found in the
search and searched the car despite P.E.A.'s objection. 164 The
security officer found marijuana in the car. 165 The police officer
was not present during the questioning or searches of the students.166
The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether
the assistant principal and security officer acted as agents of the
police. 167 According to the court, the agency rule prevents the
police from circumventing the Fourth Amendment by having a
private individual conduct a search or make a seizure that
would be unlawful if performed by the police themselves. 168 Further, the acquisition of evidence by an individual acting as an
agent of the police must be viewed by the same Fourth Amendment standards that govern law enforcement officials. 169
The P.E.A. court refused to find that an agency relationship
existed:
The focal issue in this case is whether P.E.A.'s [F]ourth
[A]mendment rights were violated when school officials questioned and searched him, and then searched his car and seized
marijuana that belonged to F.M .. If the questioning which led
to the search had been by law enforcement officials, the constitutionality of the search would be determined under the probable cause standard of the [F]ourth [A]mendment. Since the
search was incidental to the maintenance of order by school
officials and the protection of other students and was not performed by individuals acting as agents of the police, the prosecution maintains that acts of the principal and security officer
are to be governed by standards set forth in New Jersey u.
T.L.O .. We agreeP 0
The court found that the only police involvement in the search
occurred when the officer told the assistant principal that stu-

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
See id.
See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 384.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 385.
See id.
See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 385.
Id. at 386 (citation omitted).
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dents were planning to sell marijuana in school. 171 The officer
remained at school, but the assistant principal carried out the
investigation. 172
The reasonable suspicion standard may also be appropriate
in situations where police are present, but the search is initiated
and conducted by school officials. In Cason v. Cook, 173 two students told the assistant principal that they were missing belongings from their gym lockers. 174 The assistant principal asked a
police officer, who was assigned to the high school as a liaison
officer as part of a cooperative program between the school district and the police department, to accompany her to the locker
room where she investigated and learned the names of four girls
who were in the locker room at the time of the thefts. 175 Cason
was one of these girls. 176
These students did not have permission to be in the locker
room nor had they been in gym class the prior period. 177 The
assistant principal also asked the officer to accompany her as
she interviewed each girl. 178 The officer remained in the hallway
and did not participate in the questioning of one student. 179 The
officer was present during the investigation of Cason although
she did not participate in the questioning. 180
After Cason admitted to being in the locker room, the assistant principal searched her purse and found a coin purse matching the description of the one stolen. 181 The officer did a pat
down search. 182 Both students were taken to the office and given
juvenile appearance cards by the officer. 183 The appearance
cards required them and their parents to report to the officer at

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id. at 385-86.
See id. at 385.
810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 189-90.
See id. at 190.
See id.
See id.
See Cason, 810 F.2d at 190.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Cason, 810 F.2d at 190.
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the police station. 184 The girls were suspended and no further
action was taken. 185
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit faced the very issue that T.L.O. refused to address: what standard applies "when a search is conducted by
school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies." 186 The court specifically examined whether
the reasonableness standard as stated in T.L.O. should apply
when a school official acts in conjunction with a police "liaison"
officer. 187
In finding that the reasonableness standard was appropriate, the court found no evidence that any activities were at the
behest of a law enforcement agency. 188 Instead, the court stated
that a school official had conducted the investigation, limiting
the officer's involvement to a pat down search completed after
incriminating evidence had been discovered. 189 Moreover, the
court found that the officer's presenting of juvenile appearance
cards was, at most, a police officer working in conjunction with
school officials. 19° For these reasons, the court held that the imposition of a probable cause warrant requirement based on the
limited involvement of the police officer would not serve the
interest of preserving swift and informal disciplinary procedures
in schools. 191
In Commonwealth u. Carey, 192 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court treated police participation as a marginal issue. 193 In this
case, two high school students told a teacher that Carey, a senior, had brought a gun to schooU94 The teacher reported this
information to the assistant principal who, in turn, told the principal.195 The administrators had never dealt with a gun before,
so they immediately called the police. 196 When the police officer

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id.
See id.
!d. at 191 (emphasis added).
!d.
See Cason, 810 F.2d at 191.
See id.
See id. at 192.
See id. at 193.
554 N.E. 2d 1199 (Mass. 1990).
See id. See also Sanchez, supra note 116 at 401.
See Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1200.
See id.
See id. at 1201.
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arrived, he and the school administrators questioned Carey
about the gun. 197 After searching Carey and finding no gun, the
administrators searched his locker where they found a sawed-off
twenty-two caliber rifle, a gun sight, a black powdery substance,
and a bullet. 198 These were turned over to the police~ 99
As a
result, Carey was advised of his Miranda rights. 200
After Carey was convicted of unlawfully carrying a firearm,
he appealed on the grounds that involvement of a police officer
required application of the stricter probable cause standard. 201
The Massachusetts court disagreed, holding that school officials
conducted the search on their own without the aid of the police,
even though the police officer participated in Carey's questioning.202 Further, the court agreed with the lower court, which
maintained that the police had no input in the school administrator's plan and were notified for safety reasons. The court cited
the testimony of the assistant principal "that school administrators were very, very uptight and very nervous about the possibility that there was a gun in school, both for themselves and for
the school community of some 1,200 students and ninety to one
hundred employees."203
In another case involving police in a school search, a California appellate court upheld the use of reasonable suspicion when
police searched a student at the request of school officials. In the
case of People v. Alexander B., 204 members of a gang told the
dean of students that a member of a rival gang was carrying a
gun in school. 205 The dean directed the police officer to investigate the group to see whether anyone had a weapon. 206 The officer searched the group and found that Alexander B. had a machete knife. 207 Alexander B. was arrested.2°8 At the trial he filed
a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the police

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See id.
See id.
See Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1201.
See id.
See id. at 1200.
See id. at 1202.
Id. at 1201 n.2.
270 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 342.
See id. at 343.
See id.
See id.
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conducted the search and therefore needed probable cause. 209
The court denied the motion stating that the police officer acted
at the request of school officials and, therefore, the appropriate
standard was reasonable suspicion. 210
C. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard in Administrative
Searches

Another line of cases considers searches that are administrative or regulatory in nature to be satisfied through the use of a
reasonableness standard regardless of police involvement. In
1995, the United States Supreme Court rendered its second and
only opinion since T.L.O. on the Fourth Amendment rights of
students in public schools. 2 n This decision, Vernonia School
District 47J u. Acton, upheld random drug testing of student
athletes. 212 Police were not involved in the school's drug testing
program and evidence obtained through the program was not
turned over to the police. This decision is important because it
holds administrative searches in schools to the same standard
used in previous Supreme Court decisions addressing the rights
of adults.
In determining the legality of administrative searches in
schools, the Supreme Court balanced the intrusiveness of the
search on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 213 Because
administrative searches have been characterized by most courts
as being relatively unintrusive and as involving a low degree of
danger, students' Fourth Amendment interests are often outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest. For students in
public schools, this may mean a search for drugs or weapons will
be held constitutional.
While the Supreme Court has yet to grapple with the issue of
police involvement in public school searches, including searches
which are administrative in nature, numerous lower courts have
rendered opinions on this topic. Cases addressing administrative

209. See Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
210. See id. at 344. See also Sanchez, supra note 116, at 403 (concluding that the
court chose to ignore the presence and role of the police officer and instead addressed
only reasonable suspicion as it applied to school officials).
211. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
212. See id. at 666.
213. See id. at 664.

54

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1999

searches that involve police or security guards generally fall into
three broad areas. These include metal detector searches, mass
or random locker searches, and canine sniff searches. 214
1. Metal Detector Searches

People u. Dukes 215 was the first recorded decision addressing
the use of metal detectors in schools. This case involved Taw ana
Dukes, a student at the Washington Irving High School in New
York City who was scanned with a hand-held metal detector by
Jessica Wallace, a member of a team of special police officers
from the Central Task Force for School Safety. 216 Ms. Dukes' bag
was then scanned and the device signaled the presence of
meta1. 217 Officer Wallace asked Tawana to open her bag. 218 The
officer reached in and removed a manilla folder which contained
a switchblade knife. 219 Ms. Dukes was arrested and charged with
criminal possession of a weapon. 220 She moved to suppress this
evidence on the ground that her Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated. 221
Rather than using the test for reasonableness as outlined in
the T.L.O. decision, the Dukes court instead characterized this
search as a type of administrative search, which "is never linked
with probable cause or the issuance of a warrant." 222 The court
maintained that because this type of search is intended to prevent a dangerous occurrence and is aimed at a group or class of
people, it does not require individualized suspicion. 223 The Dukes
court likened this kind of search to those using scanning devices
in public buildings (e.g., airports and court houses) or highway
checkpoints for drunken drivers. 224 Citing the Supreme Court's

214. The lead case setting the standard for administrative searches in schools is
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which dealt with drug testing
of student athletes. This article does not discuss the Vernonia case in detail because
police were not involved in the search at issue in the case.
215. 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
216. See id. at 851.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
221. See id.
222. ld.
223. See id. at 851-52.
224. See id. at 852.
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opinion in Michigan u. Sitz, 225 a case dealing with sobriety stops
by police officers, the Dukes court explained the test for determining the reasonableness of such administrative searches in
the following way:
An administrative search is upheld as reasonable when the
intrusion involved in the search is no greater than necessary
to satisfy the governmental interest underlying the need for
the search. In other words, in determining whether the search
is reasonable, the courts balance the degree of intrusion, including the discretion given to the person conducting the
search, against the severity of the danger imposed. 226

Upholding the search as reasonable, the Dukes court described the metal detector search as minimally intrusive. 227
Moreover the security officer who conducted the search was
required to follow "a very detailed script" based upon guidelines
adopted by the public school system's chancellor. 228 For example
students are searched by officers of the same sex. 229 Officers
search all students unless lines become too long, then they
search randomly (i.e., every second or third student). 230 The
officer is not permitted to select any particular student unless
there is reasonable suspicion that the student has a weapon. 231
If the device sounded and the student refused to be searched
further, the student would be handed over to a school administrator standing nearby. 232 In addition the court stated that its
decision was made easier considering the compelling need for
security in schools. 233
Subsequent courts addressing metal detector searches in
234
Chicago and Philadelphia have rendered opinions similar to

225. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
226. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
227. ld.
228. !d.
229. Id. at 851.
230. See id.
231. See Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 853 (pointing out that over 2,000 weapons had been recovered in
the New York City public schools during 1990-1991, and that there had been a fatal
shooting in a Brooklyn high school only a few months before the Dukes search).
_234. See People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding Chicago
pohce officers to a reasonableness standard when assisting in random metal detector
search at public high school).
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that of Dukes. 235 In these cases the searches were conducted by
either police officers or school security guards and were found to
be reasonable under the administrative search doctrine. 236
In 1996, a Florida court went one step further in its interpretation of administrative searches. 237 In this case, a high school
with an open campus instituted a policy allowing random
searches with hand-held metal detector wands of students in
classrooms. 238 An independent security team hired by the school
district came into one room to search and observed students
passing a jacket to the back of the room. 239 The officers confiscated the jacket and found a gun. 240 A Florida court of appeals
ruled that the standard for the search was one of reasonableness
and the search was administrative and not a police search requiring probable cause. 241
2. Blanket or Random Locker Searches

In the T.L.O. decision, the Supreme Court did not decide
whether students had an expectation of privacy in their lockers.242 After T.L.O. most lower courts have viewed lockers as
school property and students as having at least a reduced expectation of privacy. Thus, even when police or school security
guards are involved, courts have generally found blanket or
random locker searches reasonable 243 (assuming there had been
some notice given to the students in advance that lockers are the
property of the school and would be subject to such searches)244

235. See In the Interest of S.S., 680 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that
a metal detector scan and subsequent search of a coat pocket by a school security
officer was an administrative search and justified).
236. See Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d at 547, 549, 551; In the Interest of S.S., 680 A.2d at
1176. See also People v. Latasha W., _ P.2d _ (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding Los
Angeles school policy allowing daily, random metal detector searches, provided some
neutral criteria was used in deciding what persons would be searched).
237. See Florida v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
238. See id. at 318.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 319, 320.
242. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 n.5.
243. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 352 (Pa. 1998) (upholding principalinitiated, random "safety inspection" search for drugs of 2,000 lockers by two police
officers).
244. See People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366, 366-68 (N.Y. 1969) (finding warrant
invalid but upholding the search on the grounds that school officials have an obligation
to maintain discipline over students where three detectives obtained a warrant to
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and permissible under the administrative search doctrine because the searches are relatively unobtrusive and are generally
concerned with a threat to health and safety (i.e., aimed at removing rotting food or finding drugs or weapons). 245
In at least some instances, these random locker searches
have extended to items inside the lockers. 246 For example, in the
Isiah B. case, Madison High School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
experienced a rash of gun-related complaints or incidents. 247
Within a month, high school administrators investigated five to
six incidents where guns were said to have been on school property and verified the existence of guns in two of these instances.248 After two incidents involving threats to the same
student, this student transferred to another school. 249 The
school's principal decided to institute locker searches after students reported being fired at while leaving a Friday night game
and hearing multiple shots after a Saturday-night school
dance. 250
A school security aide visually inspected the lockers, moving
articles inside to facilitate the observation. 251 After the aide had
searched some 75-100 lockers, and found nothing, he searched

search two students and their lockers, presented the warrant to the vice-principal, and
searched the students as well as their lockers, discovering that Overton's locker
contained four marijuana cigarettes).
245. A search of a specific student's locker for contraband, however, would still be
subject to the reasonableness test set forth in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (setting forth
two-pronged test for reasonableness). See, e.g., S.C. v. Mississippi, 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss.
1991) (upholding a warrantless search of student's locker when there was a report that
he planned to sell two handguns in his possession); State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d 17
(N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that locker search was reasonable based on student
informant's report that the student had tried to sell him marijuana); S.A. v. Indiana,
654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. App. 1995). See also Eugene C. Bjorklun, School Locker Searches
and the Fourth Amendment, 92 ED. LAW REP. 1065 (1995) (distinguishing between
searches of lockers with individualized suspicions and those without).
246. Compare In the interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W. 2d 637 (Wis. 1993) (upholding
random locker search which resulted in a gun and cocaine being found in the pocket
of a coat that was in the locker) and In the Interest of Dumas, 515 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa.
Super 1986) (concluding that students do not lose their expectation of privacy in purses
and jackets by merely storing them in a locker).
247. In the interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W. 2d 637, 638 (Wis. 1993).
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id. Evidence of a gun was found in at least one of these situations. Also,
lockers were said to be searched on a random basis; however, testimony was vague as
to what constituted "random."
251. See id. at 639.
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Isiah B.'s locker, moving the student's coat, to one side. 252 As the
aide moved the coat, he noticed that it seemed unusually heavy;
he patted its exterior, and felt a hard object, which he believed
to be a gun. 253 The security aide immediately notified the principal. But before the principal came, the aide observed the handle
of a gun after he had pulled open a pocket. 254 Isiah B. was confronted with this evidence; he admitted that he also had cocaine
in the same coat pocket. 255
There had been no individualized suspicion for the locker
search. 256 Isiah B. had no history of prior weapons violations, nor
was he suspected of such use before the search. 257 Nonetheless
Wisconsin's Supreme Court ruled that this search was legal
because students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their lockers. 258
3. Canine Sniff Searches
Most mass searches of lockers involving police also involve
canines. The United States Supreme Court responded to the
legality of dog sniffing in United States v. Place. 259 In Place the
Court held that dog sniffs of personal property do not constitute
a Fourth Amendment search because they are limited in the
way information is obtained and in the contents of the information revealed. 260 The Court also noted that the police may temporarily detain personal luggage for a canine sniff if there is a
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. 261
To control the use and sale of drugs in public schools, school
officials sometimes invite police and their dogs into the school to
sniff out contraband. 262 In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent
School District, 263 the United States Court of Appeals for the

252. See lsiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639.
258. See id. at 641.
259. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
260. See id. at 707.
261. See id. at 708-09.
262. See KERN ALEXANDER & DAVID ALEXANDER,
(3d ed. 1992).
263. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Fifth Circuit found that dog sniffing of lockers and cars was
constitutional. 264 The court reasoned that lockers and cars were
inanimate objects located in a public place: 265
Had the principal of the school wandered past the lockers and
smelled the pungent aroma of marijuana wafting through the
corridors, it would be difficult to contend that a search had
occurred .... [T]he use of the dogs' [sic] nose to ferret out the
scent from inanimate objects in public places is not treated any
differently. 266
It is important to note that the Horton court found dog sniffing of students as entirely different from dog sniffing of lockers
or cars. 267 Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places, the court stated that most persons in our
society deliberately attempt not to expose the odors emanating
from their person to the public. 268 Further, the court said that
the intensive sniffing of people, even if done by dogs, is indecent
and demeaning and therefore is a search under the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment. 269
This latter finding was not, however, followed by the Seventh Circuit in the case of Doe v. Renfrow. 270 In Renfrow the
school, with the assistance of the police, used dogs for the general, exploratory sniffing of students. 271 The school in question
was experiencing problems with drugs. 272 In cooperation with
the police, the school secured the services of a private agency
that used dogs to detect drugs. 273 Students were asked to sit
quietly at their seats while the dog handler led the dogs up and
down the desk aisles. 274 As a result of the "sniffing," a student
was searched twice. 275 The second search was a strip search,

264. See id. at 488.
265. See id. at 477.
266. !d. at 477.
267. See id. at 478.
268. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 478.
269. See id. See also ARVAL A. MORRIS, Chapter 6: Constitutional Freedom and
Government Controls over Students, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION
292, 292 (1989).
270. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
271. See id. at 91-92.
272. See Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1015.
273. See id. at 1016.
274. See id.
275. !d. at 1017.
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over the student's protests that she did not have drugs and had
never used them. 276 No drugs were found. 277
The court held that the sniff of a dog was not a search because "[t]he presence of the canine team for several minutes was
a minimal intrusion at best and not so serious as to invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment." 278 At least one lower
court, in State v. Barrett, 279 has extended this logic to uphold
searches where entire classes of students were requested to
remove the contents of their pockets and have dogs sniff those
items for contraband. 280 While the Barrett court asserted that
dog sniffs were not searches, it did concede that asking students
to empty their pockets was a search. 281 Using the three-part test
in Vernonia, the court upheld the search, maintaining that there
is a decreased expectation of privacy in schools, the search was
relatively unobtrusive, and there is a severe need to deter drug
use. zsz
In all these cases, there was at least some police involvement
and probable cause was not required. This same conclusion
holds true with subsequent dog sniffing cases where police were
actively involved in the canine sniffing of automobiles 283 and
lockers. 284 In one of these cases, Commonwealth v. Cass, 285 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld random locker searches
conducted by police officers at the request of school administrators.286
In Cass, administrators at Harborcreek High School, after
observing numerous occurrences of what appeared to be suspicious student behavior including frequent phone calls, use of

276. See id.
277. See Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1015. It was later discovered that the student
had been playing with her dog that morning and that the dog was in heat.
278. !d. at 1020. On the other hand, the court found that the strip search had
violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 1025.
279. 683 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1996).
280. See Barrett, 683 So. 2d at 337 (La. App. 1996).
281. See id.
282. See id. at 338.
283. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1989).
But see Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 334, 335 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(holding that the school did not have sufficient interest to search automobiles when
students did not have access to them during the day and that canine sniff searches of
students require individualized suspicion).
284. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981).
285. 709 A.2d 350 (1998).
286. See id. at 352.
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beepers, and the carrying of large amounts of money, requested
the state police to conduct canine sniffs of student lockers. 287
Drugs were found in only one of the 2,000 lockers searched
where drug paraphernalia and a small amount of marijuana
was seized. The student was sent to the principal's office and
read his rights. 288 In rendering its decision, the Cass court used
the Fourth Amendment as well as state law to determine that
the search was reasonable.
The majority opinion in Cass did not distinguish this case
because police were involved. Justice Zappala, in a scathing
dissent, expressed serious concerns about this involvement,
concluding that this was a police search and should have required a warrant. 289
To characterize the locker search in this case as a search by
school officials is to engage in subterfuge. Appellee's school
locker was searched by police officers and the contraband
seized as a result thereof formed the basis of a criminal prosecution .... This case does not present the question of what
degree of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a constitutional challenge to a search conducted by school officials on
school property; rather it presents the question of what degree
of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a constitutional
challenge to an evidentiary search conducted by police officers
on school property. 290

VI. STANDARDS USED WHEN SCHOOL SECURITY
GUARDSAREINVOLVEDINSCHOOLSEARCHES
Security guards are often used by school districts to assist
with school safety and discipline. 291 In determining the appropriate standard, (i.e., reasonable suspicion or probable cause) the
key question is often whether security guards are acting as
school officials or as law enforcement officers. The answer to this
question generally hinges on whether the guards are employed
by the school system and whether they are working in the capacity of a school official. Depending on the fact patterns of specific
cases, courts have rendered differing opinions about the stan-

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See id.
See id.
Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 373 (1998) (Zappala, J., dissenting).
Id. at 367.
See Rossow, supra note 30, at 30.
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dard security guards must satisfy when they conduct student
searches.
When school security guards are not employees of the school
system, are not working in the capacity of school officials, have
initiated the search, and have conducted the search for criminal
evidence, the applicable standard is probable cause. This situation is well illustrated in F.P. v. State, 292 which involved Jackie
Flint, a school resource officer, who was an employee of the sheriff's office but paid by the school board. 293 Ms. Flint's job was to
handle law enforcement in the school. 294
In this case, Ms. Flint received information from an investigator for the Tallahassee Police Department that a crime had
been committed by F.P., a student in the middle school. 295 The
investigator discovered this lead after interviewing a student in
the school who implicated his classmate, F.P. The student stated
that F.P. had stolen a car and the keys were in F.P.'s possession.296 Acting on the information, Ms. Flint brought F.P. to her
office where she discovered F.P. had the keys. 297 The trial court
found the search reasonable, but the state appeals court reversed on the grounds that the school official exception to the
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search did not
apply. 298 As the court pointed out, "even if Flint's apparently
dual role as a school official and a law enforcement officer were
not considered, the fact that she acted at the behest of a police
officer requires ... that there existed probable cause to believe
[F.P.] had violated the law and had in his possession evidence of
that violation." 299
This issue of dual role as school official and law enforcement
officer is the most problematic in determining the appropriate
standard, and the courts are divided on it. In an earlier decision,
People v. Bowers, 300 a New York appeals court held that when a
high school security officer requested a student to empty the
contents of a manilla envelope protruding from the student's

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
See id. at 1254 n.l.
See id.
See id. at 1254.
See id.
F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254.
See id. at 1255.
!d.
356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
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pocket and allegedly containing marijuana, the search was not
legal in that it required probable cause. 301
The Bowers court maintained that a security guard's reason
for being in school differed from that of a school official and that
school officials have a relationship with students different from
that of security guards hired to maintain school safety and handle disturbances and acts of crime. 302 The court went on to state
that security guards serve no official educational function as do
school officials. 303 A security officer acting without the direction
of school officials must satisfY the probable cause standard, or
any evidence turned over to the police for use in a criminal prosecution cannot be used. 304 At the time of the Bowers decision,
New York City school security officers were appointed by the
police commissioner pursuant to the Administrative Code of the
City of New York and were paid by the Board ofEducation. 305
On the other hand, in State v. Serna, 306 an Arizona appeals
court maintained that security guards, who are employed by the
school system, work in the capacity of school officials and, thus,
are only held subject to a standard of reasonableness. 307 In rendering its decision for the school district, the Serna Court stated:
[P]ublic high school security guards employed by the school
are agents of the high school principal ... [and] a warrantless
search of a student by a public high school security guard is
subject to Fourth Amendment considerations and is measured
by the standard of reasonableness under all of the surrounding
circumstances. 308
In the Serna case, Earl Starks, the chief of security at Carl
Hayden High School received a radio communication from the
principal's office to take his staff to an area where students were
allegedly involved in a fight with sticks, rocks, and possibly
weapons.:309 When the guards reached the area, they saw a stu-

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
Guards,
309.

See id. at 436.
See id. at 435-36.
See id. at 435.
See id.
See Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
860 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
See id. at 1322.
Id. at 1322. See also Pamela Manson, Search Laws Ruled Binding on School
THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 21, 1993, at B2.
See id.
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dent take something from under the bushes and put it in his
pocket. 310 They suspected the student possessed drugs after seeing a plastic baggie in his pocket. 311 The student ultimately
turned the baggie over to a police officer; the baggie was later
determined to contain cocaine. 312
The student was found guilty of cocaine possession and
placed on probation. 313 He later appealed the conviction on the
grounds that the evidence found was the result of an unreasonable search. 314 The Serna court said the search was reasonable,
noting that the school has a "substantial interest" in providing a
safe environment where learning can take place, a task that has
become more difficult because of an increase in drug use and
violent crime. 315
In S.A. v. State 316 an Indiana court of appeals also viewed
school security officers as school personnel and thus subject to
the reasonableness standard. 317 In this case there was a rash of
student locker break-ins at Howe High School in Indianapolis. 318
The lockers were not damaged and the guidance counselor noticed that her book containing the master lock combinations was
missing from her office. 319 Based on a tip from one of the students, Officer Grooms of the Indianapolis Public School Police
Department (IPSPD) searched several students' lockers, including S.A.'s, to no avail. 320 The next day there was another breakin and the same student told Officer Grooms that S.A. had the
missing book in his blue book bag. 321 Officer Grooms' assistant
removed S.A. from his class, escorted him to his locker to get his
book bag, and then took him to the principal's office where
Grooms searched the bag and found the book. 322 After first deny-

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See id.
See Serna, 860 P.2d at 1322.
See id.
See id. at 1321
See id. at 1323.
!d. at 1323-24.
654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. App. 1995).
See id. at 795,
See id. at 794.
See id.
See id.
See S.A., 654 N.E.2d at 794.
See id.
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ing it, S.A. later admitted to taking the book as well as jackets
from some student lockers. 323
S.A. was charged with two counts of theft, which, if he had
been an adult would have amounted to Class D felonies. 324 He
was adjudicated a delinquent and sentenced to probation. 325
Both the juvenile court and the Indiana appeals court denied
S.A.'s motion to suppress the evidence. 326 Ruling that S.A.'s
rights had not been violated, 327 the appeals court applied this
logic:
S.A. argues that T.L.O. is inapplicable to his situation, because
his search was conducted by a police officer rather than a
school official. We disagree. While Officer Grooms is a trained
police officer, he was acting in his capacity as security officer
for the IPS schools. Grooms is employed by the IPS PD and as
such, his conduct regarding student searches on school premises is governed by the test announced in T.L.0. 328

VII. CONCLUSION
This section summarizes the legal issues and problems arising from police involvement in schools and proposes that students be subject to the same legal standards as adults when
police and security guards are involved in school searches.

A. Legal Issues Related to Police Involvement in Public Schools
The law regarding police involvement in student searches is
clear in several respects. For example, if police initiate a search
of students in public schools and if that search is for evidence of
a criminal offense rather than violation of a school rule, then the
probable cause standard clearly applies. lfpolice are involved in
the search, but the search is at the behest of the school administrator, then the reasonable suspicion standard applies and the
test for reasonableness, as articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
would be used.
If the search is administrative, such as random locker or
metal detector searches, then reasonable suspicion is the appro-

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See
See
See
See
See

ld.

id.
id.
id.
S.A., 654 N.E.2d at 794-95.
id. at 795.
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priate standard and the three-part test articulated in Vernonia
v. Acton (need, expectation of privacy, obtrusiveness of the
search) would most likely be used. Here, the individual's expectation of privacy would be balanced against the governmental
interest (e.g., school safety).
As for school security guards, if these individuals are acting
in the capacity of police officers, or at the behest of the police,
then they are subject to the probable cause standard. If they are
acting as school officials or at the behest of school officials, or if
the search is administrative in nature, then the reasonable suspicion standard applies.

B. Legal Problems Arising from Police Involvement in Public
Schools
When a police search does not fall into one of the categories
already mentioned, it is not clear which legal standard applies.
Examples of this include police involvement in a school search
when school officials work in conjunction with the police, but
neither the police nor the school officials are completely directing the search; or when school officials work so closely with each
other that it is impossible to decide who actually directed the
search.
A similar problem occurs when school security guards take
on a role that is more like that of police officers than of school
officials. This may occur either because of past professional experiences as law enforcement officers; current responsibilities
that include assisting with school discipline, safety, and law
enforcement issues; or personal/professional relationships with
the police. When this happens, an agency relationship occurs
between school officials and the police. Because the test relies on
the subjective state of mind of both the school official and the
police, determining whether an agency relationship exists is
difficult. 3 ~ 9 As one commentator has noted, "While motive and
intent of each participant in the search may be determined by
circumstantially relevant objective facts, the test relies too
heavily on factors prone to ambiguity and fabrication." 330
Probably the most significant issue from a public policy point
ofview is what is done with the evidence obtained in the search.

329. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 172.
330. ld.
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Even though the "silver platter" doctrine prohibits school administrators from working at the behest of the police, it could be
argued that the outcome is the same when state laws require
administrators to report criminal conduct to the police. In the
latter situation, school personnel are able to collect information
and evidence without a warrant or probable cause, and this
information and evidence can then be used to prosecute students
criminally. Also, police presence during the search, even though
the search is conducted by a school official, can be an invasion of
students' rights. If the search uncovers evidence of a crime, and
the school official hands over the evidence to the police, the evidence can be used against the student. 331
This problem becomes even more complex in light of current
trends toward treating juveniles as adults for certain criminal
offenses. If juveniles are tried as adults, then they should be
afforded the same protection as adults.
C. Proposed Solutions to the Legal Dilemma

Considering the ambiguity involved in the relationships
between school officials and the police, the resultant ambiguity
in the law, and the fact that students involved in criminal offenses in the schools often are turned over to the police, the solution to this problem seems to lie in crafting uniform standards.
In other words, if police are involved in school searches, then
they should be subject to the same standards that police normally use. Also, depending upon their backgrounds and familiarity with law enforcement, school security guards should be
subject to the same standards as police officers.
Hence, the standard for administrative searches such as
metal detector searches, blanket locker searches, and drug testing should be the reasonable suspicion standard. On the other
hand, when the search is an individual search that involves
police, the standard should be probable cause. Granted, it is
important that the special environment and unique circumstances of schools be considered. Thus, no warrant would be
necessary. But the stricter standard should still apply. As noted
331. See, e.g., State v. S.A., 654 N.E. 2d. 791, 794-795 (Ind. App. 1995) (denying
student's motion to suppress evidence found in a locker search conducted by school
police officers); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (denying
motion to suppress when school authorities turned over the evidence to police). See also
supra note 13.
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earlier in this article, Justice Stevens observed in his concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that the reasonable suspicion
standard would spare school officials "the necessity of schooling
themselves in the niceties of probable cause."332 However, if
school authorities are working in conjunction with the police,
this relationship would also spare school authorities the need to
understand the intricacies of probable cause, because education
in the "niceties of probable cause" is part and parcel of both the
training and every day work oflaw enforcement officers. 333
In addition, if police are involved in the search, and the
search is for contraband that would eventually be turned over to
law enforcement authorities, then the police, by the very nature
of their involvement, are the agents of the search. They, not
school officials, are the state authorities who will be involved in
the ultimate proceedings and will benefit from the fruits of a
legal search.
It is true that school safety is of vital importance, especially
in today's society, and courts have always been concerned that
school officials be provided considerable leeway in administering
schools. 334 This plan would still allow for ample administrative
discretion. It would make no changes in any searches conducted
by school administrators without the police. The standard for
administrative searches, even those involving police and security guards, would remain as reasonable suspicion.
The only changes would be in searches that are not regulatory but involve the police or school security personnel acting in
the capacity of police, who are searching for evidence to use in
criminal proceedings. In this type of search the standard should
be probable cause, a standard that, as Justice Brennan has
pointed out, would likely be met anyway. 335 Considerable discretion would still exist under this standard because exceptions to
the warrant requirement would still apply. 336 For example, in

332. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Board of. Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 885 (1982) (maintaining that courts cannot become a "super censor" of
the school board); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (recognizing that school officials must have
the freedom to maintain order); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991)
(asserting that school authorities need discretionary authority "to function with great
efficiency and speed in certain situations").
335. See T.L.O. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. See id. at 367.
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cases of great danger and those calling for immediacy, the emergency exception would still allow school officials and police to
search without a warrant. 337 Such a plan would end the confusion as to when to apply reasonable suspicion and probable
cause in police-related school searches. Moreover, it would restore the balance between students' Fourth Amendment rights
and school administrators' responsibilities to maintain order
and discipline in the schools, a balance that was proposed in
T.L.O. but, in recent years, as many commentators have pointed
out, has gradually eroded the privacy rights of students. 338
If we are to teach students about constitutional guarantees,
then it is only fair that we also ensure these same students that
such guarantees apply to them. Affording students these
protections in relation to police searches in schools would go far
in teaching students and ourselves, as educators and scholars, a
most valuable lesson about the importance of both rights and
responsibilities in a democracy.

337. See id.
338. See, e.g., Joan E. Imbriani, Metal Detectors in Public Schools: A Subtle
Sacrifice of Privacy Interests, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 198 (1995); Sunil H.
Mansukhani, School Searches after New Jersey v. T.L.O. :Are there any Limits?, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 345 (1995-1996); Thomas C. Fischer, From Tinker to T.L.O.; Are
Civil Rights for Students Flunking in School? 22 J.L. & Enuc. 409 (1993).

